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Abstract
Background: Recent studies of social learning have revealed that adult humans are ‘‘over-imitators’’ who frequently
reproduce a model’s causally irrelevant tool actions to the detriment of task efficiency. At present our knowledge of adult
over-imitation is limited to the fact that adults do over-imitate, we know very little about the causes of this behavior. The
current study aimed to provide novel insights into adult over-imitation by extending a paradigm recently used with human
children to explore social aspects of over-imitation. In the child study observers saw two models demonstrate a tool-use
task using the same inefficient approach, or two models demonstrate different approaches to the task (one inefficient and
one efficient). The manipulation of social influence came in the testing phase where the observer completed the task in the
presence of either an inefficient model or an efficient model.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We adapted the paradigm used in the child study to provide the first systematic
exploration of factors which may lead to adult over-imitation including: 1) the presence of the model(s) during testing, 2)
the presence of a competing efficient task demonstration, 3) the presence of a majority displaying the inefficient approach,
and 4) the ‘removal’ of the experimental context during task completion. We show that the adult participants only over-
imitated in conditions where the inefficient strategy was the majority approach witnessed. This tendency towards over-
imitation was almost entirely eliminated when the participants interacted with the task when they believed the experiment
to be complete.
Conclusions: Our results suggest that adult over-imitation is best explained as a result of an evolved ‘conformist bias’
argued to be crucial to the transmission of human cultural behavior and one which may be unique in the animal kingdom.
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Introduction
Within the social learning literature a somewhat curious
phenomenon has recently received a great deal of attention. The
phenomenon in question has been dubbed ‘over-imitation’ [1], or
‘over-copying’ [2], to describe instances where observers not only
copy the actions performed by a model they do so to such an
extent that task efficiency is actually reduced (for example by
copying causally irrelevant elements of an action sequence). The
study of over-imitation has almost exclusively been confined to
early human development where a plethora of studies have
revealed a consistent pattern of over-imitation across tasks,
contexts and cultures [3–8]. Intriguingly this propensity towards
high fidelity imitation has been found to be lacking in our closest
primate cousins Pan troglodytes [3] and Pongo pygmaeus [9]. A further
intriguing finding from the over-imitation literature is that within
the human species (Homo sapiens) over-imitation increases with age
[10], with adults performing causally irrelevant tool actions with
higher levels of fidelity than preschool children [11,12]. However,
the finding that adults are more over-imitative than children has
been somewhat overlooked in the literature, a neglect which is
rather surprising as there would appear to be good developmental
reasons why children should faithfully copy the actions (even those
that appear functionless) that they witness, but why adults would
do so is less clear. The aim of the current study was to fill this gap
in our knowledge by systematically varying elements of the social
context (e.g., the number of individuals demonstrating the
inefficient strategy) in order to explore the impact on the
propensity of adults to over-imitate in a tool-use task.
The occurrence of over-imitation appears at first glance
surprising, as it suggests that rather than selecting to copy relevant
and useful information observers are blindly copying all elements
of the display, relevant or otherwise. This somewhat ‘blind’
copying would appear to degrade the usefulness of imitation as a
quick and effective strategy for learning from other individuals
within our experimental context. The challenge for researchers
interested in over-imitation is to explain why such an adaptive
strategy as imitation should on occasion spill over into inefficiency?
A suite of theories have been proposed in order to explain the
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occurrence of over-imitation in childhood, with the most
prominent stemming from social and cognitive perspectives.
There are many aspects of the social environment proposed to
lead to over-imitation in childhood including a desire to share
experience with, affiliate with, or be ‘like’, the model, or to meet
the perceived expectations of the model [13,14]. A more recent
social theory has proposed that children may be over-imitating due
to the acquisition of a prescriptive norm of what ought to be done
with a particular object [4,5]. In contrast cognitive theories of
over-imitation have proposed that the actions performed by a
model are viewed as intentional and either automatically copied
due to a distortion in causal beliefs [1,15] or through viewing the
model’s irrelevant actions as having a purpose (even though that
purpose may be unclear to the observer) [3,7].
Although theories of over-imitation are plentiful few studies
have attempted to tease apart the theories directly. One recent
attempt to disentangle the social and cognitive explanations of
over-imitation was conducted by Nielsen and Blank [14]. In this
study 4- and 5-year old observers (the term observer refers to the
test participant throughout) were allowed to witness two adult
models retrieve a reward from inside a box using one of two
strategies. One strategy was to retrieve the reward from the box
using only causally relevant tool actions (efficient approach),
whereas the alternative strategy was to retrieve the reward after
performing a series of causally irrelevant tool actions (inefficient
approach). In a modeling phase the children witnessed task
demonstration by either two inefficient models or one inefficient
model and one efficient model. The crucial manipulation came in
the testing phase where one model left the testing room leaving the
child to perform the task in the presence of either the efficient
model or an inefficient model. The authors predicted that if over-
imitation is the result of attempting to be like the model then the
participants should copy the approach of the person who
remained with them during testing, whereas the theory of
automatic copying would predict over-imitation across conditions
as each participant would have observed at least one demonstra-
tion containing the irrelevant actions. The results appeared to
provide some support for the social theory as the children only
over-imitated in the conditions where the inefficient model
remained in the testing room, and acted more selectively when
only the efficient model remained.
However, the causes of adult over-imitation remain relatively
unexplored. Are adults as influenced by the social context as
children? In order to explore this possibility the current study
aimed to replicate and extend the paradigm used by Nielsen and
Blank with a group of adult participants. More specifically
Experiment 1 aimed to replicate the three conditions presented
by Nielsen and Blank (i.e., one model always remained in the
testing room) with one crucial procedural addition. In Nielsen and
Blank the model who remained in the testing room always
presented the box to the participant leaving open the possibility
that the participants were simply adopting the rule ‘copy the
approach of the model who hands me the box’. We aimed to
control for this possibility in the current study by systematically
varying which of the two models presented the box to the
participant. It was predicted that the adult participants would
over-imitate after observing two inefficient models, however it was
less clear how the participants would perform in the mixed strategy
conditions. It may be the case that the adults would be influenced
by the presence of the model and adopt the approach of the model
who remained in the testing room, alternatively simply viewing an
efficient approach may lead the participants to perform the task
more efficiently. A further aim of Experiment 1 was to explore the
impact of model presence in more detail by presenting additional
novel conditions where both models were either present (maxi-
mum social influence) or absent (minimum social influence) from
the testing room whilst the participants completed the task. If the
presence of the models influenced task performance then we would
predict that the highest levels of over-imitation would occur when
both models remained in the testing room and the lowest levels
when the participants attempted the task by themselves. A second
experiment aimed to provide the first detailed exploration of the
role of conformity to the majority strategy in over-imitation. This
was achieved by: 1) increasing the number of inefficient strategies
modeled relative to the number of efficient strategies (3:1) and 2)
by eliminating the pressure to conform by presenting the
participants with the task outside of the experimental context.
Recent studies with young children have shown that individuals
are influenced by their peer group early in development
[16,17,18]. It was therefore predicted that if the participants
would adopt the majority approach witnessed and would
subsequently be more likely to over-imitate when presented with
a 3:1 (inefficient: efficient) strategy ratio than they would when
presented with an equal ratio of each strategy, and would be less
likely to over-imitate when completing the task outside of the
experimental context.
Experiment 1: Procedure, Results, and Discussion
We began by presenting a group of adult participants (n = 84,
37 males, mean age 21 years, range 17 to 53 years) with two task
demonstrations in which they viewed two adult models (both
female) use a tool to retrieve a reward from inside a puzzle box
(Figure 1.) The reward was either retrieved from the box using
only causally relevant actions (efficient approach), or was retrieved
after the model had performed five causally irrelevant actions
(inefficient approach). Thus inefficiency in the current task is
recognized by the reproduction of superfluous actions, a measure
of inefficiency which has been shown to relate directly to time
taken to complete the task (i.e., the more superfluous actions
performed the longer the task takes to complete) [6]. The
participants observed either two inefficient models (inefficient
strategy condition), or one efficient model and one inefficient
model (mixed strategy condition), before being allowed to attempt
the task in the presence of one, neither or both models.
Influence of Model Presence: Inefficient Strategy
Conditions
In order to explore the impact of model presence on over-
imitation the total number of irrelevant actions (max = 5, min = 0)
performed by the participants in the three inefficient strategy
conditions were analyzed using a univariate ANOVA with model
presence (one, two or no models present) as a between-participants
factor. If model presence was impacting on performance we would
expect to see high levels of over-imitation in the two conditions
where there was at least one model present and a substantially
reduced level of over-imitation in the both models leave condition.
However, the analysis revealed no significant effect of model
presence (Figure 2; F (2, 33) = 2.3, p = .11, m= .12) with the
participants in the each of the inefficient strategy conditions
performing a large number of irrelevant actions (mean irrelevant
actions: one model stays = 4.1; both models stay = 4.2; both
models leave = 2.8) irrespective of the presence of the model(s)
during testing.
The Role of Conformity in Human Over-Imitation
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Influence of Model Presence: Efficient Strategy
Conditions
As well as exploring the impact of model presence in the
inefficient strategy conditions we were also interested in how the
presence of the model(s) would impact on performance in the
mixed strategy conditions. If the presence of the model(s) was
playing a key role in determining the strategy adopted by the
observer we would expect little over-imitation in the both models
leave condition, a mixed response in the one model stays condition
(depending on which particular model remained), and an
intermediate level of over-imitation in the both models stay
condition. As with the inefficient strategy conditions the total
number of irrelevant actions performed was analyzed using a
univariate ANOVA with model presence (one (inefficient or
efficient), two or no models present) as a between-participants
factor. The analysis revealed no significant effect of model
presence (Figure 3; F (3, 44) = .91, p = .44, m= .06) with the
participants in the each of the mixed strategy conditions
performing very few irrelevant actions (mean irrelevant actions:
efficient model stays = 0.8; inefficient model stays = 0.9; both
models stay = 0.7; both models leave = 1.7) irrespective of whether
the model(s) were present or absent during testing.
These results show that the observers performed most over-
imitation in the three conditions where they were exposed to two
Figure 1. Illustration of principal task components. (1) Remove
bolts. (2) Irrelevant tool insertion, tool strikes barrier within box 3 times.
(3) Open door in order to retrieve the reward. The inefficient technique
included all 3 task components whereas the efficient technique
comprised component 3 only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050863.g001
Figure 2. Proportion of irrelevant actions performed in the inefficient strategy conditions of Experiment 1 as a function of model
presence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050863.g002
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inefficient models (see Table S1 for detailed condition breakdown).
This occurred irrespective of whether there was one model, two
models, or no models present during testing, suggesting that the
observers were not over-imitating as a result of the physical
presence of the model(s)in the testing room. The participants in the
mixed strategy conditions also appeared uninfluenced by the
presence of the model(s), with the majority of participants (65%)
opting to perform the task using the efficient approach (as
compared to only 11% in the both models inefficient condition).
The adoption of the efficient approach occurred even in the
presence of the inefficient model suggesting that, unlike the
children in Nielsen and Blank, the adult participants were not
adopting the approach of the model who remained in the testing
room. However, there are at least two possible explanations for the
reduced levels of over-imitation witnessed in the mixed strategy
conditions. It is possible that the presence of an alternative, more
efficient technique, alerted the participants to the possibly that the
reward could be obtained more readily simply by inserting the tool
in the lower hole. Second, it may be that the participants
performed less efficiently in the inefficient strategy condition as
they were conforming to the majority approach witnessed (2
inefficient vs. 0 efficient strategies). This majority strategy
contrasted with the position of the observers in the mixed strategy
conditions who saw the inefficient strategy in a 1:1 ratio with the
efficient strategy. Perhaps with an equal strategy ratio the
participants opted for the more efficient approach.
The aim of Experiment 2 was to tease apart these explanations
by presenting two novel conditions in which the observer
witnessed the efficient strategy and the inefficient strategy in
varying amounts (25% versus 75% of demonstrations respectively).
This was achieved in two ways, first by increasing the number of
models demonstrating the inefficient approach relative to those
demonstrating the efficient approach (model majority condition),
and second by having one efficient model and one inefficient
model as in Experiment 1 but increasing the number of times the
inefficient model demonstrated the task (strategy majority condi-
tion). If the presence of an efficient demonstration alone was
enough to prevent over-imitation then we would predict that very
few irrelevant actions would be witnessed in either condition as
one model always demonstrated the efficient approach. If however
over-imitation was the result of the inefficient approach being the
most frequent strategy observed then we would predict that over-
imitation would occur in both the model majority and the strategy
majority conditions as each have a 3:1 strategy ratio. Alternatively,
it may be that participants would only over-imitate if they
witnessed the majority of a group adopt this approach. If this is the
case then we would predict that over-imitation would occur in the
model majority condition only.
Figure 3. Proportion of irrelevant actions performed in the mixed strategy conditions of Experiment 1 as a function of model
presence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050863.g003
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Experiment 2A: Procedure, Results, and
Discussion
We presented a new group of undergraduate students (n = 31,
10 males, mean age 20 years, range 18 to 36 years) with four task
demonstrations, three demonstrations where the reward was
retrieved from the box using the inefficient strategy and one
demonstration where the reward was retrieved using the efficient
strategy. Sixteen of the participants (majority strategy condition)
observed two models (both female) perform all four of the
demonstrations (one model performed three inefficient demon-
strations, and one model performed one efficient demonstration),
whereas the remaining fifteen participants (majority model
condition) observed four different (all female) models (three
inefficient models and one efficient model) perform the task.
Model Majority versus Strategy Majority
Of interest was whether the number of irrelevant actions
performed by the participants would vary according to whether
they witnessed four models or two models perform the four task
demonstrations. In order to explore the impact of model versus
strategy frequency the total number of irrelevant actions
performed by the participants in Experiment 2A were subjected
to a univariate ANOVA with condition (model majority or
strategy majority) as a between participants factor. The analyses
revealed no significant difference in the number of irrelevant
actions performed between the conditions (Figure 4; F (1,
29) = .92, p = .35, m= .03) with participants copying many of the
irrelevant actions in both the model majority condition (mean
irrelevant actions = 3.2) and the strategy majority condition (mean
irrelevant actions = 2.4).
Factors which Influence Over-imitation (Experiments 1
and 2A)
Across Experiments 1 and 2A it appeared as though there were
two factors which may have influenced the levels of over-imitation
witnessed: 1) the presence of an efficient task demonstration, and/
or 2) the presence of a majority inefficient strategy (either 2:0 or
3:1). In order to explore the impact of each of these factors we
collapsed the data from the nine conditions of Experiments 1 and
2A into three groups. Group 1 (2:0 ratio) comprised the three
conditions were no efficient strategy was modeled (inefficient
strategy conditions of Experiment 1). Group two (1:1 ratio)
consisted of the four conditions where the inefficient and efficient
strategies were presented in equal frequencies (mixed strategy
conditions of Experiment 1). The final group (3:1 ratio) was made
up of the two conditions of Experiment 2A where there was an
increased ratio of inefficient strategies to efficient strategies. In
order to explore whether there were differences between the three
groups the total number of irrelevant actions performed by the
participants was subjected to a univaiate ANOVA with group (2:0
ratio, 1:1 ratio or 3:1 ratio) as a between-participants factor. The
analysis revealed a significant effect of group (F(2, 112) = 23.3,
p,.001, m= .29), with Post hoc analyses (LSD tests with
Bonferroni correction applied, adapted significance level .0167
for 3 comparisons) revealing that the participants in the 1:1 ratio
group (mean irrelevant actions = 1.0), performed significantly
fewer irrelevant actions than those in the 2:0 ratio group (mean
irrelevant actions = 3.7, p,.001), and the 3:1 ratio group (mean
irrelevant actions = 2.8, p,.001). This suggests that the presence
of an inefficient strategy majority was having a large influence on
the occurrence of over-imitation, whereas the presence of an
efficient strategy only prevented the occurrence of over-imitation
when presented in a 1:1 ratio with the inefficient strategy. The
difference between the 2:0 and 3:1 groups did not reach
significance. A full breakdown of condition comparisons is
provided in SI Table 2.
Experiment 2B: Procedure, Results, and
Discussion
The results from Experiments 1 and 2A suggest that the
presentation of an unequal ratio of inefficient to efficient task
demonstrations had a substantial impact on the likelihood that the
participants would over-imitate. These high levels of over-
imitation may have resulted from the participants adopting the
most common approach witnessed, in other words conforming to
the majority strategy. In order to further explore the influence of
conformity Experiment 2B aimed to present the task outside the
context of the experiment, thereby removing the pressure to
conform and allowing the participants to potentially display their
real knowledge of the task (i.e., perform only the causally necessary
actions).
The same participants who took part in Experiment 2A were
tested in Experiment 2B. On completion of Experiment 2A one of
the experimenters pointed to a second box (located on a shelf
directly behind the participant, out of reach of the experimenters)
and said to the participant ‘that they (the experimenters) were going to use
another box for the next participant, could you (the participant) please check to
see if the reward is inside the box?’ In order to explore whether the
participants in Experiment 2B would perform the irrelevant
actions outside of the experimental context we compared the
number of irrelevant actions performed with box 1 (Experiment
2A), to those performed on the ‘post experiment’ box 2. A
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the participants
performed significantly fewer irrelevant actions with the ‘post
experiment box’ in both the model majority condition (Figure 4;
mean irrelevant actions box 1 = 3.2, box 2 = 0.5; F(1, 14 = 28.6,
p,.001, m= .67), and the strategy majority condition (mean
irrelevant actions box 1 = 2.4, box 2 = 0.1; F(1, 15 = 15.8, p = .001,
m= .51), suggesting that the participants responses were heavily
influenced by the experimental context.
Discussion
Taken together the results of Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated
that adult humans: 1) consistently over-imitated in conditions
where the inefficient technique was in the majority, 2) always acted
efficiently in the 1:1 conditions irrespective of the presence of the
model(s) and 3) showed no evidence of over-imitation outside of
the experimental context. These findings paint a picture of adult
humans as adopting the majority behavior witnessed but not
necessarily adopting the technique of the particular model present.
This pattern of performance shares some similarities and
differences to that of the children from previous studies [1,3,14].
Like adults children faced with a majority inefficient strategy
frequently over-imitated irrespective of whether the model(s) were
present or absent from the testing room [3]. However, unlike
adults, when presented with two alternative strategies children
tended to adopt the approach of the model present, irrespective of
strategy efficiency [14]. A difference between adults and children
was also evident outside of the experimental context where Lyons
et al. (2007) found that, unlike our current adults, children
frequently continued to over-imitate when the experiment was
‘complete’ [1].
These discrepancies in performance suggest that over-imitation
may stem from a variety of mechanisms that differ from observer
to observer. With respect to over-imitation in childhood the
The Role of Conformity in Human Over-Imitation
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finding that some children continued to over-imitate outside of the
experimental context suggests that there may be some distortion in
cognitive processing not evident in the current adult sample, for
example through continuing to attribute an unknown purpose to
the model’s intentional actions [3,7]. However, as well as cognitive
influences children also appear to be heavily influenced by their
social environment as evidenced by the selective copying witnessed
in Nielsen and Blank. This affiliative tendency may be particularly
strong in the case of young children who are viewing models much
older, and subsequently more dominant, than themselves [11].
There is also evidence to suggest, through verbal exclamations,
that some young children over-imitate due to the acquisition of a
prescriptive norm of how the object works [4,5].
It therefore appears that the routes to over-imitation, particu-
larly in childhood, may be varied and comprise both social and
cognitive mechanisms. However, the performance of the current
adult participants suggests that they were predominantly influ-
enced by their social world, continually adopting the majority
approach witnessed. The tendency of our adults to veer towards
the majority approach suggests that they were best described as
conformists, perhaps even ‘‘over-conformists’’ [19]. Whiten
proposed that over-conformity occurs in instances where actions
are copied despite the presence of counter evidence, resulting in
the copying behavior being somewhat maladaptive. This tendency
towards over-conformity was particularly striking in the instances
where the participants witnessed, and subsequently ignored, an
efficient technique in favour of an inefficient task variant. The
inefficiency of the participants in the experimental context
contrasted sharply with the almost complete lack of irrelevant
actions performed when the participants believed that the
experiment was over. This increased efficiency clearly demon-
strated that the participants understood the causality of the task, so
why were the participants so conformist within the experimental
context?
One reason that the participants may have evidenced over-
conformity is that in such a thoroughly cultural species such as
ourselves it is adaptive to copy the approach of the majority of
those around you. Richerson and Boyd [20] proposed that
evolution has equipped humans with a set of ‘‘fast and frugal’’
(p. 119) heuristics which allow individuals to select the optimum
behavior without expending energy trying out various alternatives.
One such heuristic is a ‘conformist bias’ where in general it pays
individuals to copy the most common behavior witnessed as this
behavior has likely been selected as the most adaptive through
processes such as natural selection, guided variation and content
bias [20]. Clearly a heuristic such as this would be extremely
beneficial in the majority of circumstances, however it also has the
potential to allow an individual to inadvertently copy maladaptive
traits. In this sense the over-imitation witnessed is not ‘foolish’ or
Figure 4. Proportion of irrelevant actions performed with box 1 in the model majority and strategy majority conditions of
Experiment 2A and with box 2 of Experiment 2B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050863.g004
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‘silly’ rather it is the result of an over-extension of a powerful social
cognition that is the bedrock of human culture [2,19].
As well as providing the first empirical evidence of conformity in
adult over-imitation the current results may also shed some light
on the type of conformity that is taking place. This question has
been somewhat neglected outside of the social psychology
literature, and is one which has recently begun to stimulate a
great deal of interest in animal social learning [21]. Cialdini and
others [22–25] have proposed that conformity can result from an
individual attempting to behave accurately in a situation where
psychological uncertainty is high (informational conformity), or
through an individual attempting to manage social relationships
(normative conformity), suggesting an affiliative motive to confor-
mity. Similarly, with more direct reference to over-imitation,
Kenward et al. [4,5] have suggested that instances of over-
imitation may stem from the adoption of a prescriptive norm. In
support of the norm theory there are various features [21] of the
current participants’ performance which suggest that normative
conformity was prevalent: 1) the behavior stopped outside of the
experimental context, 2) the individual acted on unreliable social
information, and 3) the participants displayed the most frequent
behavior witnessed even when it was not optimal [20]. This
pattern of behavior suggests that these individuals were concerned
with social aspects of the environment, perhaps attempting (not
necessarily consciously) [26] to portray a positive image of
themselves or maintain positive social interactions with the models
[21,23]. Intriguingly normative conformity was witnessed regard-
less of how the inefficient majority was achieved (i.e., either
through a model majority or a strategy majority), information
which appears counter to our intuitive understanding of the results
of the seminal social psychology studies of Asch [27,28], and
provides crucial information for the mathematical modelling of
cultural transmission [29,30]. The current results also suggest that
the removal of the models from the testing room may not have
prevented conformity from occurring. The participants in the both
models inefficient condition of Experiment 1 continued to over-
imitate when both models left the testing room suggesting that the
adult participants may have continued to conform, perhaps
deeming themselves to still be under experimenter observation.
In contrast to the high levels of over-imitation witnessed in the
inefficient majority conditions 65% of the adult observers in the
1:1 ratio conditions were able to over-ride social information in
order to perform the task efficiently (see SI Table 3 for a detailed
breakdown of performance). This suggests that the presence of one
inefficient task demonstration was not sufficient to induce
normative conformity when a more efficient counter strategy
was witnessed. However, it may be that we are witnessing
informational conformity in these conditions. If we view the
observer as part of the group [31] then the strategy balance
switches from a 1:1 ratio to a majority efficient approach (2
efficient versus 1 inefficient), perhaps leading to engagement in
informational conformity. Indeed, many characteristics of infor-
mational conformity were evident [21] in the mixed strategy
conditions of Experiment 1 including: 1) the observers displayed
the more frequent optimal behaviour, 2) the observers relied on
their own experience rather than unreliable social information,
and 3) the efficient strategy was adopted outside of the
experimental context. However it appears as though informational
conformity was limited to instances where the task variants were
presented in a 1:1 ratio, or when the conflict between the variants
was removed by leading the participant to believe the experiment
was complete. In every other instance the participants appeared to
be engaging in normative conformity, thereby neglecting their
own causal knowledge, and engaging in a ‘foolish’ strategy which
may be the most powerful cultural tool available to Homo sapiens.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Life Sciences Ethics Committee
at Heriot Watt University (Application 2011:113) and all
participants provided written informed consent.
Apparatus
The task used in the current study was a tool based task which
has been successfully employed with adults in previous studies
[11,12]. The end result of the task was to withdraw a reward (a
magnet backed slip of paper saying ‘Congratulations!’) from inside
a transparent puzzle box using a magnet tipped probe. The
reward was withdrawn by the model using one of two strategies
each of which differed in the level of efficiency. The efficient action
sequence required the model to use only causally relevant actions
to retrieve the reward (open a small door on front of the box and
insert the probe into the hole behind). In contrast the inefficient
action sequence required the model to perform five causally
irrelevant actions (uncover a hole on top of the box by removing
two bolts, insert the probe into the top hole and strike a false
ceiling inside the box three times), before successfully using the
probe to withdraw the reward from the lower hole. Of interest was
whether participants would copy all of the actions, irrespective of
their causal relevance (i.e., over-imitate), or perform only the
actions necessary to obtain the goal. Two different, but almost
identical, versions of the box were used. In Experiments 1 and 2A
the box used was constructed from thin Perspex for use in human
studies whereas the box used in Experiment 2B was identical in
every respect with the exception that it was constructed from
thicker Perspex for use in comparative studies.
Procedure
In Experiment 1 the participants observed two adult female
models perform either two inefficient task demonstrations or one
inefficient and one efficient task demonstration before being
allowed to interact with the task in the presence of one model, both
models or neither of the models. In Experiment 2A the ratio of the
inefficient to efficient strategies was increased by increasing the
number of models demonstrating the task or by increasing the
number of times an individual model demonstrated the inefficient
strategy. Across experiments the instructions given to the
participants during task demonstration, ‘‘watch this’’, and task
presentation, ‘‘now it’s your turn’’, were minimal. In the one or both
models leave conditions of Experiment 1 the circumstance in
which the model(s) left the testing room was designed to be as
natural as possible. In the one model leaves conditions the
departing model said: ‘‘I’m sorry that’s my phone, I’ve got to take this’’
before leaving the testing room. The script was similar in the both
models leave conditions with one model saying ‘‘I’m sorry that’s my
phone I’ve got to take this’’ before going on to say to the other model,
‘‘actually, that’s X (a mutual friend) she will want to speak to you too’’
before both left the testing room. The models encouraged the
participant to interact with the box in their absence ‘‘we will just be a
minute, you continue’’ before leaving the testing room. The models
surreptitiously viewed the participant through a concealed
window, and re-entered the testing room once the participant
had completed the task.
Within each condition of Experiments 1 and 2A various
controls were put in place to ensure that there were no biases
towards copying a particular model, or towards copying a
The Role of Conformity in Human Over-Imitation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 December 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 12 | e50863
particular strategy depending on the order in which it was
presented. More specifically, in the inefficient strategy conditions
of Experiment 1 the controls included: 1) counterbalancing the
order (first or second) in which each model demonstrated the task,
and 2) counterbalancing the identity of the model who presented
the box to the participants. In the mixed strategy conditions of
Experiments 1 and 2A the controls included: 1) systematically
varying the identity of the model who played the role of the
inefficient model and the efficient model, 2) counterbalancing the
order in which the participants witnessed the efficient strategy (first
or second in Experiment 1; first, second, third or fourth in
Experiment 2A), and 3) ensuring that the box was presented to the
participants equally often by an inefficient model and the efficient
model. Preliminary analyses revealed that the participants’
performance across experiments was not biased by a particular
model, or by the order in which a strategy was presented. Similarly
there was no influence of observer sex on task performance
therefore these factors were excluded from the main analyses.
Data analysis
The mean number of irrelevant actions performed in the both
models inefficient conditions (n = 3) and the mixed strategy
conditions (n = 4) of Experiment 1 were analyzed separately using
two univariate ANOVAs with condition (one, two or no-models
present) as a between-participants factor. Similarly, the data from
Experiment 2A was analyzed using a univariate ANOVA with
condition (model majority or strategy majority) as the between
participants factor. The data from these 9 conditions were then
collapsed into 3 groups (inefficient majority conditions 2:0 or 3:1,
and strategy equal conditions 1:1) and analyzed initially using a
between participants ANOVA, before a series of post hoc Tukey
tests (with a Bonferroni correction applied, adapted significance
level .0167 for 3 comparisons) were conducted in order to explore
whether there were differences between the three condition types.
In order to explore whether the removal of the experimental
context in Experiment 2B influenced the number of irrelevant
actions performed we conducted two repeated measures ANOVAs
with box (1 or 2) as the within-participants factor (one ANOVA
each for the model majority and strategy majority conditions). The
final analysis (the results of which are presented in Table 2) was a
cross condition comparison of performance in each of the 11
conditions of Experiments 1 and 2. The data were initially
subjected to a univarite ANOVA with condition as a between-
participants factor before a series of Post Hoc Tukey LSD tests
were conducted (with a Bonferroni correction applied, adapted
significance level .0009 for 55 comparisons).
Coding and Reliability
The performance of the participants was videotaped using a
camera which was positioned unobtrusively outside of the
observer’s line of sight. The data from twenty individuals
representing 17% of the overall sample was re-analyzed by a
naı¨ve coder. This revealed that there was a great deal of
consistency between the raters with respect to the occurrence of
bolt removals and irrelevant actions (Cohen’s k= 1.0 in both
cases).
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Table S1 Column 1 lists the individual conditions of
Experiments 1 and 2A. Column 2 indicates whether or not the
majority of models were inefficient. Column 3 indicates whether or
not the majority of strategies were inefficient. Column 4 indicates
whether or not there was an inefficient model present during
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Table S2 Columns 1 and 2 list the individual conditions
and the experiment in which they took place. Column 3
shows the mean number of irrelevant actions performed listed
from highest to lowest. Columns 4–13 show the cross condition
comparisons revealed by post hoc Tukey LSD (with Bonferroni
correction applied, adapted significance level .0009) tests following
a univariate ANOVA with condition as a between participants
factor where * is significant. Numbers in brackets indicate the
number of models present during testing.
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Table S3 Proportion of participants who performed: 1)
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